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Abstract: DSGE-models have become important tools of analysis not only in 
academia but increasingly in the board rooms of central banks. The success of these 
models has much to do with the coherence of the intellectual framework it provides. 
The limitations of these models come from the fact that they make very strong 
assumptions about the cognitive abilities of agents in understanding the underlying 
model. In this paper we relax this strong assumption. We develop a stylized DSGE-
model in which individuals use simple rules of thumb (heuristics) to forecast the 
future inflation and output gap. We compare this model with the rational expectations 
version of the same underlying model. We find that the dynamics predicted by the 
heuristic model differs from the rational expectations version in some important 
respects, in particular in their capacity to produce endogenous economic cycles.  
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acknowledged. 1. Introduction 
 
The most fundamental development in macroeconomics during the last few decades 
has been the systematic incorporation of the paradigm of the utility maximizing 
forward looking and fully informed agent into macroeconomic models. This 
development started with the rational expectations revolution of the 1970s, which 
taught us that macroeconomic models can only be accepted if agents’ expectations are 
consistent with the underlying model structure. The real business cycle theory (RBC) 
introduced the idea that macroeconomic models should be “micro-founded”, i.e. 
should be based on dynamic utility maximization. While RBC models had no place 
for price rigidities and other inertia, the New Keynesian School systematically 
introduced rigidities into similar micro-founded models. These developments 
occurred in the ivory towers of academia for several decades until in recent years 
these models were implemented empirically in such a way that they have now become 
tools of analysis in the boardrooms of central banks. The most successful 
implementation of these developments are to be found in the Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium models (DSGE-models) that are increasingly used in central 
banks for policy analysis (see Smets and Wouters(2003), Christiano, et al.(2007, 
Smets and Wouters(2007), Adjemian, et al. (2007)). 
There can be no doubt that this approach to macroeconomics has important 
advantages compared to the previous macroeconomic modeling approaches. The main 
advantage is that it provides for a coherent and self-contained framework of analysis. 
This creates a great intellectual appeal. There is no need to invoke ad-hoc assumptions 
about how agents behave and how they make forecasts. Rational expectations and 
utility maximization provide the discipline about what is acceptable in modeling the 
behaviour of agents.  
There are also problems in this new modeling approach. The most important one is 
the informational assumption underlying the DSGE-models. This is that agents are 
assumed to understand the structure of the underlying model. This follows directly 
from the rational expectations assumption which requires agents to use the underlying 
model structure to make forecasts.  
  2The scientific evidence from other sciences (psychology, brain sciences) casts doubts 
about the plausibility of this assumption.  It is no exaggeration to say that there is now 
strong evidence that individual agents suffer from deep cognitive problems limiting 
their capacity to understand and to process the complexity of the information they 
receive.  
Many anomalies that challenge the rational expectations assumption were discovered 
(see Thaler(1994) for spirited discussions of these anomalies; see also Camerer and 
Lovallo, (1999), Read and van Leeuwen, 1998, Della Vigna(2007)). We just mention 
"anchoring" effects here, whereby agents who do not fully understand the world in 
which they live are highly selective in the way they use information and concentrate 
on the information they understand or the information that is fresh in their minds. This 
anchoring effect explains why agents often extrapolate recent movements in prices.  
In general the cognitive problem agents face leads them to use simple rules 
("heuristics") to guide their behaviour (see Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and Weinberg, 
2006).  They do this not because they are irrational, but rather because the complexity 
of the world is overwhelming. In a way it can be said that using heuristics is a rational 
response of agents who are aware of their limited capacity to understand the world. 
The challenge when we try to model heuristics will be to introduce discipline in the 
selection of rules so as to avoid that “everything becomes possible”.  
One important implication of the assumption that agents know the underlying model’s 
structure is that all agents are the same. They all use the same information set 
including the information embedded in the underlying model. As a result, DSGE-
models routinely restrict the analysis to a representative agent to fully describe how 
all agents in the model process information. There is no heterogeneity in the use and 
the processing of information in these models.  This reduces the usefulness of DSGE-
models for the analysis of short-term and medium-term macroeconomic problems 
which is about the dynamics of aggregating heterogeneous behaviour and beliefs
1. 
Thus, while DSGE-models have led to important new insights thanks to the coherence 
of their intellectual framework, there is a need to go beyond the overly restrictive 
informational assumption that requires agents to fully understand the complexity of 
                                                 
1 There have been attempts to model heterogeneity of information processing in rational expectations 
models. These have been developed mainly in asset market models. Typically, it is assumed in these 
models that some agents are fully informed (rational) while others, the noise traders, are not. See e.g. 
De Long, et al. (1990). 
  3the world in which they live. In this paper we develop an alternative macroeconomic 
model that incorporates the idea that agents use simple rules (heuristics) in forecasting 
and we contrast the results of this “heuristic model” with a stylized version of the 
DSGE-model, which will be labeled the “rational model”. The purpose is not to show 
that the alternative model is better (this can only be done by empirical testing which is 
not done in this paper), but rather to highlight the differences in the dynamics that 
arise from using different informational assumptions.  
  
2. A heuristic model 
 
In this section we describe how an alternative modeling strategy can be developed. 
We do this by presenting a standard aggregate-demand-aggregate supply model 
augmented with a Taylor rule. The novel feature of the model is that agents use 
simple rules, heuristics, to forecast the future. These rules are subjected to a selection 
mechanism. Put differently, agents will endogenously select the forecasting rules that 
have delivered the highest fitness in the past. This selection mechanism acts as a 
disciplining device on the kind of rules that are acceptable. Since agents use different 
heuristics we also obtain heterogeneity. This, as will be shown, creates endogenous 
business cycles.  
We will contrast the behaviour of this model with a similar model that incorporates 
rational expectations, and that we interpret as a stylized version of DSGE-models. 
This comparison will also allow us to focus on some crucial differences in the 
transmission of shocks, in particular of monetary policy shocks. 
Obviously, the approach presented here is not the only possible one. In fact, a large 
literature has emerged attempting to introduce imperfect information into 
macroeconomic models. These attempts have been based mainly on the statistical 
learning approach pioneered by Sargent(1993) and Evans and Honkapohja(2001). 
This literature leads to important new insights (see e.g. Gaspar and Smets(2006), 
Orphanides and Williams(2004), Milani(2007)). However, we feel that this approach 
still loads individual agents with too many cognitive skills that they probably do not 
posses in the real world
2. A similar criticism can be developed against another 
                                                 
2 See the fascinating book of Gigerenzer and Todd(1999) on the use of simple heuristics as compared 
to statistical (regression) learning.  
  4approach at modeling imperfect information based on “rational inattention” (see 
Mackowiak and Wiederholt(2005), Sims(2005)). 
Our approach is also not the first attempt to introduce heuristics into macroeconomic 
models. Recently, Brazier et al. (2006) have done so in the context of an overlapping 
generations model, and Branch and Evans(2006) have developed models with 
imperfectly informed agents. In addition, there is a large literature of behavioural 
finance models that now incorporate the view that agents are limited in their cognitive 
skills and use heuristics to guide their behaviour and forecasting (see Brock and 
Hommes(1997), Lux and Marchesi(2000), De Grauwe and Grimaldi(2006)).  
 
 
2.1 The model 
 
The model consists of an aggregate demand equation, an aggregate supply equation 
and a Taylor rule.  
The aggregate demand equation can be derived from dynamic utility maximization. 
This produces an Euler equation in the same vain as in DSGE-models. We obtain  
 
t t t t t t t t E r a y a y E a y ε π + − + − + = + − + )
~
( ) 1 (
~
1 2 1 1 1 1    (1) 
 
where yt is the output gap in period t, rt is the nominal interest rate, πt is the rate of 
inflation, and εt is a white noise disturbance term.   t E
~
 is the expectations operator 
where the tilde above E refers to expectations that are not formed rationally. We will 
specify this process subsequently.  We follow the procedure introduced in DSGE-
models of adding a lagged output in the demand equation. This is usually justified by 
invoking habit formation. We keep this assumption here as we want to compare the 
heuristic model with the DSGE-rational expectations model.  However, we will show 
in section 5 that we do not really need this inertia-building device to generate inertia 
in the endogenous variables.   
The aggregate supply equation can be derived from profit maximization of individual 
producers. We assume as in DSGE-models a Calvo pricing rule, which leads to a 
  5lagged inflation variable in the equation
3. The supply curve can also be interpreted as 
a New Keynesian Philips curve.  We obtain:  
t t t t t t y b b E b η π π π + + − + = − + 2 1 1 1 1 ) 1 (
~
   (2) 
 
Finally the Taylor rule describes the behaviour of the central bank 
 
t t t t t t u r c y c c r + + + − = −1 3 2
*
1 ) ( π π      (3) 
 
where   is the inflation target which for the sake of convenience will be set equal to 
0. Note that we assume, as is commonly done, that the central bank smoothens the 
interest rate. This smoothing behaviour is represented by the lagged interest rate in 
equation (3). Ideally, the Taylor rule should be formulated using a forward looking 
inflation variable, i.e. central banks set the interest rate on the basis of their forecasts 
about the rate of inflation. We have not done so here in order to maintain simplicity in 
the model.   
*
t π
We assume that agents use simple rules (heuristics) to forecast the future output and 
inflation. The way we proceed is as follows. We start with a very simple heuristics for 
forecasting and apply it to the forecasting rules of future output. We assume that 
because agents do not fully understand how the output gap is determined, their 
forecasts are biased. We assume that some agents are optimistic and systematically 
bias the output gap upwards, others are pessimistic and systematically bias the output 
gap downwards.  
 




     (4) 
 
The pessimists are defined by  g y E t
pes
t − = +1
~
     (5) 
where g > 0 expresses the degree of bias in estimating the output gap. We will 
interpret 2g to express the divergence in beliefs among agents about the output gap.  
Note that we do not consider this assumption of a simple bias to be a realistic 
representation of the how agents forecast. Rather is it the most parsimonious 
representation of a world where agents do not know the “truth” (i.e. the underlying 
                                                 
3 It is now standard in DSGE-models to use a pricing equation in which marginal costs enter on the 
right hand side. Such an equation is derived from profit maximisation in a world of imperfect 
competition. It allows introducing more detail into the model and makes it possible to specify 
productivity shocks better. It also allows for analyzing how shocks in markups affect the economy. We 
have not tried to introduce this feature here (see Gali(2008), Smets and Wouters(2003)).  
  6model) and have a biased view about this truth. Our aim is to contrast the dynamics 
obtained in a model using such a simple heuristics with the one obtained in models 
where agents are assumed to know the “truth”.  
The market forecast is obtained as a weighted average of these two forecasts, i.e.  
 
pes
t t pes t
opt
t t opt t t E y E y E
~ ~ ~
, 1 , 1 α α + = + +   (6) 
 
g g y E t pes t opt t t , , 1
~
α α − = +      (7) 
 
and   1 , , = + t pes t opt α α      (8) 
 
where   t opt, α  and   t pes, α   are the weights of optimists, receptively, pessimists in the 
market. 
A methodological issue arises here. The forecasting rules (heuristics) introduced here 
are not derived at the micro level and then aggregated. Instead, they are imposed ex 
post, once the demand and supply equations are derived. This has also been the 
approach in the learning literature pioneered by Evans and Honkapohja(2001). Ideally 
one would like to derive the heuristics from the micro-level in an environment in 
which agents experience cognitive problems. Our knowledge about how to model this 
behaviour at the micro level
4 and how to aggregate it is too sketchy, however, and we 
have not tried to do so.  
As indicated earlier, agents are rational in the sense that they continuously evaluate 
their forecast performance. We follow Brock and Hommes(1997) in specifying the 
procedure agents follow in this evaluation process. Recently, Branch and Evans(2006) 
introduced this selection mechanism in a macroeconomic model.  








k t k t opt k t
k
k t opt y E y U − − − −
∞
=
− − = ∑ω ]
]
                                                







k t k t pes k t
k
k t pes y E y U − − − −
∞
=
− − = ∑ω     (10) 
 
 
4 Psychologists and brains scientists struggle to understand how our brain processes information. There 
is as yet no generally accepted model we could use to model the micro-foundations of information 
processing. 
  7where Uopt,t and Upes,t  are the forecast performances of the optimists and pessimists, 
respectively. These are defined as the mean squared forecasting errors (MSFEs) of the 
optimistic and pessimistic forecasting rules; ωk  are geometrically declining weights.  
The proportion of agents using the optimistic and the pessimistic forecasting rules is 
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Equation (11) says that as the past forecast performance of the optimists improves 
relative to that of the pessimists more agents will select the optimistic belief about the 
output gap for their future forecasts. As a result the proportion of agents using the 
optimistic rule increases. Equation (12) has a similar interpretation. The parameter γ 
measures the “intensity of choice”, i.e. the intensity with which agents allow their 
choice for a particular heuristic to depend on past forecast performance. In the limit 
when γ = ∞ only one, the best performing heuristic, will be selected.   
Note that this selection mechanism is the disciplining device introduced in this model 
on the kind of rules of behaviour that are acceptable. Only those rules that pass the 
fitness test remain in place. The others are weeded out. In contrast with the 
disciplining device implicit in rational expectations models which implies that agents 
have superior cognitive capacities, we do not have to make such an assumption here.  
It is also useful to point out that the selection mechanism used here can be interpreted 
as an evolutionary mechanism that allows high forecasting performance to spread 
throughout the economy through replication.   
Agents also make forecasts of inflation in this model. At this stage of the analysis we 
will simply assume that all agents perceive the central bank’s announced inflation 







t t t E π π = +   (where for the sake of simplicity we assume the inflation target to be 
                                                 
5 Such a specification is often used in discrete choice theory. See Anderson,  de Palma, and  Thisse, 
(1992) 
  8equal to 0). We will extend this simple inflation forecasting process in a later section 
when we will also assume that there is heterogeneity of beliefs in the inflation 
forecasting process. We keep homogeneity of beliefs here to focus on the impact of 
heterogeneity in the forecasting of future output gaps.   
The solution of the model is found by first substituting (3) into (1) and rewriting in 
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where bold characters refer to matrices and vectors. The solution for Zt  is given by  
 
[ ] t 1 t t t
1
t
v   b Z   C Z E   B A Z




t r     (14) 
 
The solution exists if the matrix A is non-singular, i.e. if (1-a2c2)a2b2c1 ≠ 0. The 
system (14) describes the solution for yt and πt given the forecasts of yt and πt . The 
latter have been specified in equations (4) to (12) and can be substituted into (14). 
Finally, the solution for rt  is found by substituting yt and πt obtained from (14) into 
(3).  
Our research strategy consists in comparing the dynamics of this heuristic model with 
the same structural model (aggregate demand equation (1), aggregate supply equation 
(2) and Taylor rule equation (3)) under rational expectations which we interpret as a 
stylized DSGE-model. .  
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t 1 t t t t v  Z Λ Z E   Φ  Z Ω + + = −     (15) 
 
[ t 1 t t t
1
t v  Z Λ Z E   Φ   Ω  Z + + = −
− ]      (16) 
 
This model can be solved under rational expectations using the Binder-Pesaran(1996) 
procedure.  
 
2.2 Calibrating the heuristic and the rational model  
We proceed by calibrating the model. In appendix A we present the parameters used 
in the calibration exercise. We have calibrated the model in such a way that the time 
units can be considered to be months. In section 7 we present a sensitivity analysis of 
the main results to changes in the main parameters of the model.  
We show the results of a simulation exercise in which the three shocks (demand 
shocks, supply shocks and interest rate shocks) are i.i.d. with standard deviations of 
0.5%.  
We first present a simulation in the time domain. Figure 1 shows the time pattern of 
output and inflation produced by the heuristic model. We observe a strong cyclical 
movement in the output gap. The source of these cyclical movements is seen to be the 
weight of optimists and pessimists in the market (see second panel of figure 1). The 
model in fact generates endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism. During some 
periods pessimists dominate and this translates into below average output growth. 
These pessimistic periods are followed by optimistic periods when optimistic 
forecasts tend to dominate and the growth rate of output is above average. These 
waves of optimism and pessimism are essentially unpredictable. Other realizations of 
the shocks produce different cycles. (In appendix B we give a few additional 
examples).  
These endogenously generated cycles in output are reminiscent of what Keynes called 
“animal spirits”. In our model these animal spirits are created by a self-fulfilling 
mechanism that can be described as follows. A series of random shocks creates the 
possibility that one of the two forecasting rules, say the optimistic one, delivers a 
higher payoff, i.e. a lower MSFE. This attracts agents that were using the pessimistic 
rule. The “contagion-effect” leads to an increasing use of the optimistic belief to 
  10forecast the output-gap, which in turn stimulates aggregate demand. Optimism is 
therefore self-fulfilling. A boom is created. At some point, negative stochastic shocks 
make a dent in the MSFE of the optimistic forecasts. The pessimistic belief becomes 
attractive and therefore fashionable again. The economy turns around.   
 
 
  Figure 1: Output gap and inflation in heuristic model 






























































  11From figure 1 (third panel) we observe that inflation is relatively stable and fluctuates 
around the target (set at 0) in a relatively narrow band. This result has everything to 
do with our assumption that agents are homogeneous in giving full credibility to the 
inflation target of the central bank. We will return to this when we introduce 
heterogeneity among agents in their perception of the credibility of the central bank’s 
inflation target.  
We contrast these results with those obtained using the model under rational 
expectations. We use the same structural model with the same parameter values for 
the aggregate demand, supply and Taylor equations. In addition the shocks are the 
same with the same iid structure.  
We show the results in figure 2. Two differences stand out. First the rational 
expectations model does not produce clear cyclical movements in the output gap. In a 
way this is not surprising: the shocks are white noise and the transmission mechanism 
exhibits a minimal degree of inertia. In full-fledged DSGE-models the inertia is more 
complex and the shocks typically exhibit autoregressive patterns that are important in 
producing cyclical movements in output. Thus our results suggest that the cycles 
produced in the DSGE models come to a large extent from outside the model. We 
return to this issue in section 6 where we analyze the degree of inertia produced by the 
two models.  
Second, the volatility of output and inflation is higher in the rational expectations 
model compared to the heuristic model. This can also be seen from table 1 where we 
show the standard deviations of the output gap and inflation in the two models. Again 
this has to do with the minimal inertia assumed in the underlying structural model. 
Much of the attempt to fit the rational expectations model (DSGE-models) has 
consisted in adding additional lags so as to produce more persistence and less short-
term volatility.  
 
  
  12Figure 2: Output gap and inflation in the rational model 







































Table 1 : Standard deviations of output gap and inflation 
heuristic model  rational model 
     
output  gap     0.86    1.35 
inflation     0.56    0.89 
Note: these standard deviations are the averages obtained from simulating the model 1000 




2.3 Impulse responses in the heuristic and the rational model 
 
The next step in the analysis is to compute the impulse responses to shocks. Here we 
focus on the impulse responses to an interest rate shock, defined as plus one standard 
deviation of the shock in the Taylor equation.  
The peculiarity of the heuristic model is that for the same parameters of the model the 
impulse responses are different for each realization of the stochastic shocks. This 
  13contrasts with the rational expectations model where the impulse response functions 
are not sensitive to the realization of the stochastic shocks (keeping the parameters 
unchanged). We will return to this difference and give it an interpretation.   
Figure 3 shows the mean impulse responses to an interest rate shock. We constructed 
the mean response by simulating the model 100 times with 100 different realizations 
of the shocks. We then computed the mean response together with the standard 
deviations. Figure 3 shows the mean response (the dotted lines are the mean response 
+ and – 2 standard deviations; note also that we introduced the shock after 100 
periods). We obtain the standard result of an interest rate shock on output and 
inflation. However, the uncertainty surrounding this result is considerable at least in 
the short run.  
Where does this uncertainty come from? Not from parameter uncertainty. We use the 
same parameters in constructing all our impulse responses. The answer is that in this 
heuristic model each realization of the shocks creates different waves of optimism and 
pessimism. We could also call this “market sentiments”. Thus a shock that occurs in 
period 100 in one simulation happens in a different market sentiment than the same 
shock in another simulation. In addition, the shock itself affects market sentiments. As 
a result, the short-term effects of the same interest rate shock become very hard to 
predict. We observe from figure 3 that a significant part of the output and inflation 
effects are positive in the short run. In section 2.6 we elaborate further on this theme 
and illustrate how particular differences in “market sentiments” affect the impulse 
responses to shocks. 
Another way to interpret this result is to say that the timing of the shock is important. 
The same shocks applied at different times can have very different short-term effects 
on inflation and output. In other words, history matters. This contrasts with what 
rational expectations models tell us. In these models the timing of the shock does not 
matter. In this sense the rational expectations model is a-historic
6. 
Note that the uncertainty about the impulse responses tends to disappear in the long 
run, as the effect of short-term differences in market sentiments disappears.    
                                                 
6 Michael Woodford has claimed that rational expectations models of the kind analyzed here have an 
element of historic dependence. This follows from the fact the existence of lags in the model. The 
historic dependence we are talking about here is of another nature.   
  14We computed similar impulse responses to an interest rate shock in the rational 
expectations model. The results are shown in figure 4.  The first thing to note is that 
there is no uncertainty about these impulse response functions, as long as the 
parameters of the model are known with certainty. This contrasts with the heuristic 
model where even if we know the parameters of the model with certainty, we are still 
uncertain about the impulse responses because the latter depend on the realizations of 
the shocks (and thus market sentiments). In the rational expectations model, 
uncertainty about the effects of monetary policy only arises because the parameters of 
the model are not known with certainty.  
This difference in the nature of uncertainty in a heuristic and a rational expectations 
model has everything to do with the fact that the former has non-linear features while 
the latter is linear. Thus the additional uncertainty produced by the heuristic model, 
i.e. the dependence of the impulse response functions on the state of the economy is 
the outcome of its non-linearity. Rational expectations models including the DSGE-
models traditionally impose some linearization procedure. This is done for the sake of 
mathematical simplicity. It leads to a problem though. If the microfoundation of the 
model leads to a non-linear model, it is important to know how  this non-linearity 
(which is part of the micro-foundation) affects the dynamics generated by the model. 
Eliminating these non-linearities amounts to destroying information that is relevant to 
predict the transmission of shocks. This may not matter much for the long run, but 
since the DSGE-models have the ambition of forecasting the transmission process, it 
is of significant importance.  
 
Figure 3: Mean impulse responses to interest rate shock in the heuristic model 
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mean impulse response interest rate
 
Note: The dotted lines represent the impulse responses with +/- 2 standard deviations 
 
  Figure 4: Impulse responses to interest rate shock in rational model 
 































































impulse response interest rate
 
 
A second contrast between the impulse responses generated by the two models is that 
the size of the effects of the same interest rate shock in output and inflation is 
significantly higher in the rational expectations model (compared to the mean effect in 
the heuristic model). Again this has to do with the low level of inertia in the rational 
expectations model.  
 
2.4 The extended heuristic model 
 
In this section we extend the heuristic model by allowing the inflation forecasters to 
be heterogeneous. We follow Brazier et al. (2006) in allowing for two inflation 
forecasting rules. One rule is based on the announced inflation target (as in the 
previous section); the other rule extrapolates inflation from the past into the future. 
One may argue that this is quite a different pair of heuristics than in the case of output 
forecasting. The difference between inflation forecasting and output forecasting is that 
in the former case there is a central bank that announces a particular inflation target. 
This target works as an anchor for the forecasts of agents. Such an anchor is absent in 
the case of output forecasting.  
The “inflation targeters” use the central bank’s inflation target to forecast future 
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The market forecast is a weighted average of these two forecasts, i.e.  
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We use the same selection mechanism as in the previous section based on the mean 
squared forecasting errors produced by the two rules to determine the proportions of 
agents trusting the inflation target and those who do not trust it and revert to 
extrapolation of past inflation, i.e.  
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This inflation forecasting heuristics can be interpreted as a procedure of agents to find 
out how credible the central bank’s inflation targeting is. If this is very credible, using 
the announced inflation target will produce good forecasts and as a result, the 
proportion of agents relying on the inflation target will be high. If on the other hand 
the inflation target does not produce good forecasts (compared to a simple 
extrapolation rule) it will not be used much and therefore the proportion of agents 
using it will be small.  
We calibrated the model using the same parameters as in the previous section. We 
first show the results in the time domain and then discuss the impulse response 
functions.  
Figure 5 presents the results for the output gap in the time domain. We find the same 
cycles in the output gap as in the previous section. Again these cycles are related to 
the waves of optimism and pessimism in the forecasting (second panel in figure 5).  
The results concerning the time path of inflation are shown in figure 6. We first 
concentrate on the second panel of figure 6. This shows the proportion of 
“extrapolators”, i.e. the agents who do not trust the inflation target of the central bank. 
We can identify two regimes. There is a regime in which the proportion of 
extrapolators fluctuates around 50% which also implies that the proportion of 
forecasters using the inflation target as their guide (the “inflation targeters”) is around 
  1850%. This is sufficient to maintain the rate of inflation within a narrow band of 
approximately + and – 1% around the central bank’s inflation target. There is a 
second regime though which occurs when the extrapolators are dominant. During this 
regime the rate of inflation fluctuates significantly more. Thus the inflation targeting 
of the central bank is fragile. It can be undermined when forecasters decide that 
relying on past inflation movements produces better forecast performances than 
relying on the central bank’s inflation target. This can occur quite unpredictably as a 
result of stochastic shocks in supply and/or demand.  
 
  Figure 5: Output gap in the extended heuristic model  






































How can the central bank strengthen the inflation targeting regime?   The previous 
simulations assumed an output coefficient of 0.5 in the Taylor equation. This is a 
value often found in empirical work. It implies that the central bank gives some 
weight to output stabilization. In a way an output coefficient of 0.5 implies that the 
central bank deviates from strict inflation targeting. As an alternative the central bank 
  19could apply strict inflation targeting, implying that the output coefficient is 0
7. We 
show the results of a simulation when the central bank sets the output coefficient 
equal to zero (strict inflation targeting) in figure 7. We now observe that with strict 
inflation targeting the first regime dominates, i.e. the rate of inflation stays within the 
narrow band of +/- 1% most of the time. There are occasional “dérapages” into the 
second more turbulent regime but these are less frequent and less persistent. This has 
all to do with the fact that a sufficiently large proportion of agents continue to trust the 
central bank’s inflation target as a guide in forecasting. 
 
Figure 6: Inflation in the extended heuristic model 







































                                                 
7 This is our interpretation of strict inflation targeting. There is another one which interprets strict 
inflation targeting to put a zero weight to the output gap in the loss function of the monetary 
authorities. In this interpretation, the coefficient of the output gap in the Taylor rule could be positive 
because the central bank may use the information embedded in the output gap to better forecast 
inflation. See Svensson().  
  20Figure 7: Inflation in the extended heuristic model with strict inflation targeting 






































We come back to this issue of the strictness of inflation targeting in section 4 when 
we subject the choices of the central bank to a more systematic analysis. 
 
2.5 Impulse responses in the extended heuristic model 
 
In this section we present the impulse responses to a positive interest rate shock of 
one standard deviation. Two results stand out. First the uncertainty surrounding the 
effects of interest rate shocks is greater and lasts longer than in the simple heuristic 
model with homogenous inflation forecasting. Second, there is in this extended model 
considerably more inertia in inflation adjustment than in output adjustment following 
the interest rate shock. This feature whereby there is more inertia in inflation 
adjustment than in output adjustment after a shock is routinely found in VAR 
estimates of interest rate surprises. The inertia generated by the model finds its origin 
in the evolutionary process inherent in the fitness criterion guiding the selection of 
forecasting rules
8.   
 
                                                 
8 A similar result was obtained by Anagastopoulos, et al. (2006) 
  21Figure 8: Mean impulse responses to an interest rate shock in the extended 
heuristic model  
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2.6 Market sentiments and impulse responses 
An important finding of our model is the dependence of the impulse responses on the 
initial conditions. This implies that the transmission of shocks depends on the exact 
timing of these shocks. The reason is that “market sentiment” changes continuously 
thereby changing the transmission of these shocks.  
There are two sources of “market sentiment” in the model. One originates with the 
waves of optimism and pessimism produced by the switching dynamics between 
  22optimistic and pessimistic rules in forecasting output. The second one arises from the 
switches between the two inflation forecasting rules, producing periods of confidence 
in the inflation target announced by the central bank and periods of skepticism about 
this inflation target.  
In this section we discuss with a few representative examples the nature of this 
dependence of the transmission mechanism on market sentiments. We start with 
presenting two impulse responses to the same interest rate shock (a one standard 
deviation increasing in the interest rate). These two shocks occur when the market 
sentiments are very different. We show the results in figure 9. The left hand panel 
shows the impulse response of inflation to an interest rate increase that occurs when 
the market is skeptical about the announced inflation target. This can be seen by the 
fact that when the shock occurs (in period 100), almost all agents have become 
extrapolators, i.e. they have lost confidence in the inflation target. The right hand 
panel shows the impulse response when the interest rate shock occurs at a time when 
the weight of extrapolators is low. This is a regime characterized by confidence in the 
inflation target.  
 The results are striking. When the market is skeptical about the inflation target the 
interest rate shock has a substantial effect on inflation, while when the market exhibits 
confidence in the inflation target the same interest rate increase has only a very small 
effect on the rate of inflation. Conversely, since the impulse responses are symmetric, 
a decline in the interest rate has a strong positive effect on inflation when the market 
is skeptical and a weak effect on inflation when the market is confident in the 
inflation target. This result is akin to the stabilization bonus obtained in a fully 
credible inflation targeting regime.   
This dependence of the impulse responses on the market sentiments is also obtained 
when demand and supply shocks occur. We show an example involving a supply 
shock in figure 10. The left hand panel exhibits the impulse response of output to a 
supply shock when the market sentiments about output growth are optimistic, while 
the right hand panel shows the same impulse response when the market sentiments are 
pessimistic. Again the results are striking. When optimists prevail a negative supply 
shock has a significantly lower and shorter-lived negative effect on output than when 
pessimists dominate the market. 
 
  23Figure 9: Impulse responses of inflation to interest rate shock (increase) 
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Figure 10:  Impulse responses of output to supply shock 
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  243. On the importance of inflation targeting 
 
In the previous section we analyzed the model assuming that the central bank follows 
an inflation targeting strategy. We assumed two regimes, one in which all agents 
attach full credibility to the inflation target, and another one in which some agents 
believe this target and others do not. In this section we perform another experiment 
with the model. We will now contrast a regime in which none of the agents attach 
credibility in the central bank’s inflation target with one in which some do and others 
do not attach credibility. This experiment can then be interpreted as mimicking a 
regime change whereby the central bank moves away from a regime in which the 
inflation target has no credibility towards  a regime of (limited) credibility of inflation 
targeting.  
We model the first regime as one in which agents do not take the inflation target into 
account when forecasting the future inflation. Thus there is only one inflation 
forecasting rule that all agents use, i.e. the extrapolative rule as represented by 
equation (18). The second regime corresponds to what we have called the extended 
heuristic model in which we use the two inflation forecasting rules (17) and (18). 
We first present the results of simulating these two regimes in the time domain using 
the same calibration as in the previous sections. Figures 11 and 12 show the evolution 
of the output gaps and the fraction of optimists in the two inflation targeting regimes. 
The results are striking. In the regime of complete absence of a credible inflation 
target the cycles in the output gap are much longer than in the regime of imperfectly 
credible inflation targeting. These longer cycles in the former regime are related to the 
fact that the waves of optimism and pessimism are longer and more protracted. This 
difference is also evident from the autocorrelation coefficients of the output gap. In 
the first regime without inflation targeting this autocorrelation coefficient is 0.44 
while it is only 0.29 in the regime with imperfectly credible inflation targeting. In 
addition, we find that the standard deviation of the output gap is 1.6% in the first 
regime versus 1.1% in the second regime. Thus the introduction of (imperfectly) 
credible inflation targeting reduces the volatility of the output gap and makes the 
waves in the output gap shorter (it reduces the inertia as measured by the 
autocorrelation coefficient).  
  25The reason why we obtain such a pronounced difference in output stabilization is 
related to the fact that in the absence of a credible inflation target,  the rate of inflation 
is subjected to stronger movements than in the regime of imperfectly credible 
inflation targeting. We show the contrast in figures 13 and 14. It can clearly be seen 
that inflation in the former regime fluctuates much more than in the latter regime. 
(The standard deviation of inflation in the former regime is 1.98% versus 0.96% in the 
latter regime).  
The higher volatility of inflation in the regime where the inflation target lacks all 
credibility forces the central bank to adjust the interest rate in a more aggressive way 
than in the regime with imperfectly credible inflation targeting. As a result, the 
absence of a credible inflation target produces more volatility in the interest rate. This 
increased volatility becomes a source of additional volatility in the output gap. We 
conclude that the establishment of an inflation targeting regime (even if imperfectly 
credible) stabilizes not only the rate of inflation but also the business cycle. This 
remarkable property is obtained even in a world where agents cannot form 
expectations rationally.  
 Figure 11: Output in a regime without credible inflation target 







































  26Figure 12: Output in a regime with (imperfectly) credible inflation target 






































Figure 13: Inflation in a regime without credible inflation target 



















Figure 14: Inflation in a regime with (imperfectly) credible inflation target 
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Next we compare the impulse responses of output and inflation in the two regimes. 
We focus on the responses to a (negative) supply shock. These impulse responses are 
shown in figures 15 and 16. We find that in the absence of a credible inflation target, 
the negative supply shock leads to a significantly longer adjustment in output and 
inflation than in the regime of imperfectly credible inflation targeting. Put differently, 
a negative supply shock leads to a less protracted effect on output and inflation in a 
regime of imperfectly credible inflation targeting than in the absence of a credible 







Figure 15: impulse responses of output and inflation (absence of credible 
inflation target 
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9 This has also been found in DSGE-models and is sometimes called the stabilization bias. See Gaspar, 
et al. (2006) 
  28Figure 16: impulse responses of output and inflation (with imperfectly credible 
inflation target) 
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4. Trade-offs between inflation and output variability 
We have seen that the central bank can reduce inflation variability by applying a 
stricter inflation targeting regime. This comes at a price in terms of output volatility 
though. We analyze this tradeoff in the context of the extended heuristic model and 
compare it to the tradeoff in a rational expectations model. 
Figure 17 presents the tradeoff in the heuristic model and figure 18 in the rational 
expectations model. These tradeoffs are obtained by increasing the output coefficient 
(c2) in the Taylor rule from 0 to 1 and then computing the standard deviations of 
inflation and output gaps for these different values of c2. These standard deviations 
are then plotted in figures 17 and 18. We have computed tradeoffs corresponding to 
different values of the inflation coefficient in the Taylor rule, from c1 = 1 to c1 = 2. As 
a result, we obtain a three-dimensional figure which plots the tradeoffs between 
inflation and output volatility on the axes labeled “std inflation” and “std output”. The 
axis labeled “Taylor inflation parameter” shows the different values of the c1 
parameter used to construct the tradeoffs.  
The tradeoffs obtained in figures 17 and 18 show that the central bank that wishes to 
reduce inflation volatility by applying stricter inflation targeting (an increasing value 
  29of c2) will have to allow for more output variability. We also note from figures 17 and 
18 that the trade-off improves when c1 increases, i.e. when the central bank reacts 
more forcefully to an inflation upsurge, it can achieve both lower inflation and output 
variability
10.   
 








































































                                                 
10 A similar result on the importance of strict inflation is also found in Gaspar, Smets and 
Vestin(2006) who use a macromodel with statistical learning.   





































Comparing figures 17 and 18 we observe that the inflation-unemployment tradeoffs 
are systematically higher in the extended heuristic model than in the rational model. 
This difference has much to do with the fact that in the heuristic model the credibility 
of the inflation target is imperfect, i.e. there is often a large proportion of agents who 
do not attach credibility to the inflation target. In the rational model we assume 
perfect credibility of the inflation target. It is therefore more appropriate to compare 
the rational model with the simple heuristic model that also assumes perfect 
credibility of the inflation target. We show the corresponding inflation output 
tradeoffs obtained in the simple heuristic model in figure 19. The contrast with figure 
18 (the rational model) is strong, and even starker with the extended heuristic model 
(figure 17). The tradeoffs obtained in the simple heuristic model are lower than in the 
rational model and even more so than in the extended model.  
A second point of difference is that in figure 19 we obtain tradeoffs that are 
practically horizontal lines. This suggests that there is a strong stabilization bonus in 
the heuristic model when the credibility of the inflation target is perfect: the central 
bank can reduce output volatility without appreciable loss in terms of increased 
inflation volatility. This stabilization bonus appears to be much stronger in the 
heuristic model than in the rational model.  
 
  315. Welfare analysis 
In this section we compare welfare obtained in both models. We assume a loss 
function of the central bank applying equal weights to inflation and output variability. 
This approach is not fully satisfactory. Ideally we should specify the central bank’s 
utility function from the start and derive the optimal policy. We leave that for further 
research.  
We obtain the welfare losses for different values of c1 and c2 as shown in figure 20. 
We compare the welfare losses in the rational model and the simple heuristic model. 
As was mentioned earlier, both models assume full credibility of the inflation target. 
We find that the simple heuristic model produces lower welfare losses than the 
rational model for all values of c1 and c2.  This result is related to our previous finding 
that the tradeoff between inflation and output is uniformly lower in the simple 
heuristic model than in the rational model. This in turn follows from the fact that the 
simple heuristic model produces more inertia in output and inflation than the rational 
model.  
We also note that in the rational model, increasing output stabilization (increases in 
the Taylor output parameter, c2) reduces welfare losses more than in the simple 
heuristic model.   
It is also useful to compare the losses obtained in the simple heuristic model (perfect 
credibility) with the losses from the extended heuristic model (imperfect credibility). 
We show the losses from the latter in figure 21. A comparison between the two 
models clearly illustrates the power of credibility in the inflation target in reducing 
welfare losses. This has to do with the result previously noted, i.e. that a credible 
inflation target reduces both the volatility of inflation and output.  
Finally figure 22 shows the welfare losses in the heuristic model in the absence of a 
credible inflation target. We observe that in this case the welfare losses are uniformly 
higher than in the case of imperfect credibility (compare figures 22 with 21). This 
confirms again that credibility tends to reduce both the volatility of inflation and of 
output.  
  32Figure 20: Welfare losses in the rational and the simple heuristic model 
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6. Endogenous and exogenous inertia 
 
As pointed out earlier, DSGE-models introduce inertia into the model by imposing 
lags into the transmission mechanism, the logic of which comes mostly from outside 
the model. To give an example, Calvo pricing in which firms are constrained to adjust 
prices instantaneously (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001)) is routinely 
imposed in these models. It is clear, however, that such a restriction comes from 
outside the logic of the model. In a world where everybody understands the model 
and each other’s rationality, agents would want to go immediately to the optimal plan 
using the optimal price.  They would not want to accept such a restriction
11.   
We could call the inertia introduced in the DSGE-model an exogenously created 
inertia. In contrast, the heuristic model presented here is capable of generating inertia 
without imposing lags in the transmission process. This could be called endogenous 
inertia. We illustrate this difference by analyzing the heuristic and the rational model 
in the absence of lags in the transmission process in the demand and the supply 
                                                 
11 The use of Calvo-pricing rules is often justified by invoking institutional restrictions that limit the 
freedom of action of individual firms. The question arises why rational and perfectly informed agents 
would accept institutions that limit their freedom to set optimal plans. After all, it is against their own 
interest to accept such limitations. It is not only against the interests of the firms, but also of consumers 
and workers, who in the rational macroeconomic models are agents who perfectly understand the world 
and their own interests and will always want to optimize their utilities. Any limitation on their 
optimizing behaviour reduces their welfare. 
  34equations. We achieve this by setting a1 = 1 in equation (1) and b1 = 1 in equation (2). 
We then applied the same i.i.d. shocks in both the heuristic and the rational model and 
computed the autocorrelation coefficients of the simulated series of output gaps and 
inflation. We show the results in table 1. We observe that the heuristic model 
produces inertia (positive autocorrelation) in the output gap and in inflation even if 
there are no lags in the transmission of shocks. Our rational model produces no inertia 
in the output gap and in inflation.  
Table 1 also shows the autocorrelation coefficients obtained in models that assume 
lags in the transmission. These coefficients are obtained when we set a1 = 0.5 in 
equation (1) and b1 = 0.5 in equation (2). These are also the numerical values assumed 
in all the simulations reported in the previous sections. We now observe that inertia in 
the output gap and in inflation increases in both models. However, it can be concluded 
that all of the inertia obtained in the rational model is the result of the lags in the 
transmission process. This is not the case in the heuristic model where most of the 
inertia is produced endogenously.  
We also note from table 2 that even when the coefficients a1 and b1 of the forward 
looking variables of the model are set at 0.5, the rational model produces less inertia 
than the heuristic model. We explore the sensitivity of the autocorrelation coefficients  
to these parameters more exhaustively in figure 23. This shows the autocorrelation 
coefficients as a function of a1 and b1.  We observe that in the heuristic model the 
autocorrelation coefficients are not very sensitive to the a1 and b1.   This contrasts a 
great deal with the results of the rational model, where the sensitivity is very high. 
When a1 and b1  are close to 1 (i.e. no or weak lags in the transmission) the 
autocorrelation coefficients are very low (very low inertia). In order to produce inertia 
in the rational model which is of the same magnitude as in the heuristic model, a1 and 
b1 must exceed 0.5.   
This difference between the two models is quite fundamental. In the rational model 
there is (due to its linearity) no uncertainty about how the shock is transmitted in the 
model. Thus in the absence of lags in the transmission, agents will immediately find 
the optimal levels of output and inflation with minimal inertia
12. In order to produce 
the required inertia, lags in the transmission preventing instantaneous adjustment to 
                                                 
12  There could still be inertia in output which is produced because agents smooth consumption over 
time after a productivity shock. This effect is very weak though in the model used here.  
  35the optimal plan, are necessary. In the heuristic model, agents do not fully understand 
how the shock will be transmitted. As a result they follow a procedure (heuristics 
together with a selection mechanism) that functions very much like a “trial and error” 
mechanism aimed at revealing the information about shocks and the transmission 
process. This is a slow process that also uses backward evaluation processes. It 
generates an endogenous inertia into the model.  
Critics of the heuristic model presented here may argue that the comparison between 
the rational and the heuristic model is unfair for the rational model. Indeed the 
heuristic model generates inertia because the evaluation and selection process of the 
different heuristics is backward looking. This is the reason why the heuristic model 
does not need lags in the transmission process to generate inertia. However, we claim 
that this evaluation and selection process can only be backward looking, and as a 
result, the lags that are present in the heuristic model are completely within the logic 
of that model. This contrasts with the lags introduced in the rational model: they come 
from outside the model.  
 
Table 2 : Autocorrelation coefficients in output gap and inflation 
No lags in transmission     
    heuristic  model rational  model 
 
output  gap     0.77    0.07 
inflation     0.69    -0.02 
 
Lags in transmission 
    heuristic  model rational  model 
 
output  gap     0.89    0.79 
inflation     0.90    0.61 
 
Note: the autocorrelation coefficients are the averages obtained from simulating the model 
1000 times, each time over 1000 periods. 
 
 
  36Figure 23: Autocorrelation coefficients of output gap and inflation 
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7. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we analyse how sensitive the results are to different numerical values 
of the “learning parameters” in the model. These are the parameters describing how 
agents use and select forecasting rules. There are three such parameters in our model. 
First, there is the divergence between the optimists and pessimist beliefs. We will call 
this the divergence parameter, which we define as 2g (remember that g is the bias of 
the optimists and –g is the bias of the pessimists).  
Second, there is the memory agents have when calculating the performance of their 
forecasting. This was represented by the parameter ωk  in equations (9)-(10) and is a 
series of declining weights attached to past forecast errors. We define     
(and 
k
k ρ ρ ω ) 1 ( − =
1 0 ≤ ≤ ρ ). The parameter ρ can be interpreted as a measure of the memory of 
agents. When  ρ  = 0 there is no memory; i.e. only last period’s performance matters 
in evaluating a forecasting rule; when ρ  = 1 there is infinite memory.  
  37Finally, there is the parameter γ  which measures the intensity with which agents are 
willing to switch to a better performing rule (see equations (11)-(12)).  
We discuss the sensitivity of the results with respect to these parameters by showing 
how these parameters affect the volatility of inflation and output, and the degree of 
inertia (autocorrelation) in these variables.  
 
7.1 Sensitivity to divergence in beliefs 
 
The upper panels of figure 24 show how the volatility of output and inflation depends 
on the degree of divergence in beliefs in forecasting output. We observe that when 
divergence increases the volatility of output increases substantially. No such increase 
occurs with inflation which is not surprising as the divergence parameter relates to 
differences in beliefs about future output.  
The lower panels of figure 24 indicate that increasing divergence tends to increase 
inertia in output (autocorrelation), with little effect on inflation inertia.  
 
Figure 24: Standard deviation and autocorrelation of output gap and inflation 
 















































































Note: the standard deviations and autocorrelation coefficients are the averages obtained from 
simulating the model 1000 times, each time over 1000 periods. 
  387.2 Sensitivity to memory 
The memory agents use when they evaluate their past performance, plays an 
important role in the dynamics of the model. This is illustrated by figure 25. The 
upper part shows the volatility of output and inflation for different values of the 
memory parameter (ρ). It is striking to find that with increasing memory the volatility 
of these variables declines significantly. Note however that the relationship is non-
linear. One needs a large value of ρ for the volatility to start declining. In the 
simulations presented in the previous sections we set ρ=0.5. The volatility obtained 
for this parameter value is very close to the volatility obtained when ρ=0 (i.e. when 
agents have no memory and only the performance of the last period).  
We obtain similar results with the autocorrelation coefficients of output and inflation. 
For low and medium values of  ρ the autocorrelation coefficients are relatively 
constant. One needs a sufficiently large value of the memory parameter to reduce the 
autocorrelation coefficients significantly.  We conclude that long memory tends to 
stabilize output and inflation and to reduce inertia in these variables.  
 
Figure 25: Standard deviation and autocorrelation of output gap and inflation 





























































































Note: the standard deviations and autocorrelation coefficients are the averages obtained from 
simulating the model 1000 times, each time over 1000 periods. 
  397.3 Sensitivity to intensity of choice 
 
The intensity of choice parameter controls the degree with which agents switch from 
one rule to the other when the performance of the forecasting rules change. In general 
we find that, as this parameter increases, volatility and inertia tend to increase.  This is 
illustrated in figure 26. The upper panel shows the volatility of output and inflation as 
a function of the intensity of choice parameter. We observe a clear positive relation. 
The lower panel shows how the autocorrelation coefficients increase when intensity 
of choice is increased.  
We conclude that as agents react more forcefully to changes in performance of their 




Figure 26: Standard deviation and autocorrelation of output gap and inflation 





























































































Note: the standard deviations and autocorrelation coefficients are the averages obtained from 






  408. Empirical validation 
 
No attempt is made in this paper to rigorously validate the model empirically. We 
only present some partial empirical validation. This consisted in computing the 
autocorrelation function of simulated inflation and to compare this with the 
autocorrelation function estimated for the US inflation during the period 1957-2006. 
We show the results in figures 27 and 28. 
    
Figure 27 






























Autocorrelation function simulated inflation
  
Figure 28 
































Autocorrelation Function US inflation 1957-2006
 
We find that the pattern of autocorrelation of the simulated interest rate is 
qualitatively similar to the one observed in the monthly data for the US, i.e. there is a 
  41long positive autocorrelation followed by negative autocorrelation. Obviously this 




DSGE-models provide a coherent framework of macroeconomic analysis. This 
coherence is brought about by restricting acceptable behaviour of agents to dynamic 
utility maximization and rational expectations. These features explain the intellectual 
appeal of these models and their recent success in academic circles and among 
policymakers.   
The problem of the DSGE-models (and more generally of macroeconomic models 
based on rational expectations) is that they assume extraordinary cognitive 
capabilities of individual agents. Recent developments in other disciplines including 
psychology and brain science document that individual agents struggle with limited 
cognitive abilities, restricting their capacity to understand the world. As a result, 
individual agents use small bits of information and simple rules to guide their 
behaviour.  
We have used these new insights to extend the DSGE-model framework to an 
environment in which agents use simple rules to forecast output and inflation. In order 
to provide discipline in the use of these rules we have introduced a mechanism that 
allows for the selection of those rules that are more profitable than others.  
The ensuing “heuristic model” produces a number of results that distinguishes it from 
the rational expectations models. First, the heuristic model is capable of generating 
endogenous cycles based on waves of optimism and pessimism. This dynamics is akin 
to what Keynes called animal spirits. Second, in contrast to the rational expectations 
DSGE-models the inertia in output and prices is generated internally in the model, 
instead of being “imported”. Third, due to its non-linearity, the heuristic model 
produces a degree of uncertainty about the transmission of monetary policy shocks 
that is different from the uncertainty obtained in DSGE-models. In the latter linear 
models, uncertainty about the effects of monetary policy shocks arises only because 
of the lack of precision in the estimation of the structural parameters of the model. In 
the heuristic model there is an additional dimension to uncertainty. This is that the 
  42same policy shock can have different effects depending on the state of the economy, 
including the degree of optimism and pessimism agents have about the future. As a 
result, the effectiveness of policy shocks depends on the timing of these shocks. This 
is an insight not found in mainstream DSGE-models. True, the DSGE-models can 
potentially produce similar results. However, these have routinely been excluded by 
linearizing an otherwise non-linear model.  
A fifth result is that inflation targeting turns out to be of great importance to stabilize 
the economy in a heuristic model. We found that in the absence of a credible inflation 
target, the swings in waves of optimism and pessimism are more variable and more 
protracted producing more volatility in output than when agents (not necessarily all of 
them) trust the announced inflation target. At the same time supply shocks lead to 
more pronounced and long-lasting effects on output in the absence of inflation 
targeting than when inflation targeting has some credibility. Finally, we also confirm 
the existence of a stabilization bonus for the monetary authorities when the market 
finds the inflation target to be credible, i.e. in such an environment of credibility 
interest rate changes conducted by the central bank have a less pronounced effect on 
inflation.  
The success of DSGE-model has much to do with the story it tells about how the 
macroeconomy functions. This is a story in which rationality of superbly informed 
and identical agents reigns. Shocks from the outside occur continuously forcing these 
agents to re-optimize all the time. Unfortunately and inexplicably, the outside world 
imposes restrictions on this behaviour creating distortions and departures from 
optimality. It also generates cycles in output and inflation. This in turn creates a 
stabilizing responsibility for the central bank.   
We have questioned this story by presenting an alternative one. This is a story in 
which agents do not understand the model well, and use a trial and error strategy to 
discover its underlying logic. Such a model generates cycles endogenously. Thus in 
contrast with the DSGE-world where the shocks come from outside, in the heuristic 
world some shocks are generated within the model.   
There is another dimension in the difference between the two models. In his famous 
AER-article Hayek(1945) stressed that individuals have only very small parts of the 
available information in their brains. No individual can ever hope to understand and to 
  43process the full complexity of the world in which he lives. That’s why markets are so 
important. They are vehicles that efficiently aggregate information that is spread 
around in society. Our model is in the logic of this Hayekian view. This is the logic 
that produces cycles when markets aggregate the different and incomplete pieces of 
information individuals use when forecasting the future.    
The research presented in this paper should be considered to be preliminary. In order 
to be convincing as an alternative modeling strategy, a rigorous empirical evaluation 
of the model will be necessary, whereby the predictions of the model are confronted 
with the data. In addition, the menu of heuristics which is extremely small in this 
paper will have to be broadened so that the selection of the “fittest” rules can occur 
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